Abstract. Privacy considerations are one serious point against current DRM systems, because they would allow the License-Issuers to collect large amounts of user data, up to the the time a user listens to a song or which users are reading which kind of books. This sort of data could be used for marketing purposes but also for malicious deeds. This paper addresses this threat and establishes a DRM architecture which protects user privacy by the core of its design by adding a third trusted party and an appropriate communication protocol. The work was influenced by a project in mobile DRM based on the OMA specification [1] .
Introduction
Privacy is a fundamental right in a free society, therefore its protection should be an integral part of every new technology which could be used to harm it.
Digital Rights Management (DRM), or Digital Restrictions Management as referred to by its critics [2] , covers technologies for enforcing access and usage rules on digital content by encrypting the content objects and the use of licenses which contain the decryption-key and usage-rules. In times of global connectivity even with mobile devices DRM systems implemented without an eye upon protecting user privacy by fundamental design aspects can easily harm personal information rights of the customer or even be used to facilitate user surveillance.
A typical DRM architecture can be seen in Figure 1 . The content provider packages content objects from its databases and encrypts them before offering them to the customer through a specified interface. The customer can download the content and acquire a license from the License-Issuer with the help of the local DRM client. The license includes the necessary key to decrypt the content along with usage rules which are enforced by the DRM client.
Because the content has to be decrypted on the client-side one can actually see that this sort of system can in the end only seriously be secured against local attacks if the DRM software is secured by means of hardware, which could be solved by the use of trusted computing (see [3] and [4] for more information about trusted computing concerning DRM). In the case of DRM privacy may be harmed because the License-Issuer in recent implementations is e.g. able to obtain detailed personalized usage profiles. But privacy is not incompatible with this new technology [5] . In this paper we want to draft a possible architectural solution which protects user privacy in a DRM system by design, so that buying a song on the internet would be like buying a CD in a shop by cash again as far as privacy protection is concerned. After all the shopkeeper should only be interested in being paid, and no customer would want to leave his/her address and bank data at every shop or even inform the shopkeeper every time before consuming the product. Also it should not be possible for the vendor to create named purchase statistics without the explicit affirmation of the consumer.
In the following we want to draft an architecture which not only secures user privacy and thus enhances the chance of user acceptance for DRM but which also has additional benefits for the other involved participants. In particular we will shortly investigate current DRM systems and their handling of user privacy in section 2. After that we will establish concrete requirements for a DRM architecture which protects user privacy in section 3 and discuss our solution to it in section 4. Closing we will discuss the pros and cons of the drafted architecture.
Current DRM Systems and User Privacy
In one of the leading DRM specifications for mobile devices used currently, the OMA DRM v2.0 specification, it is exclusively stated that privacy aspects are not covered and had to be investigated and integrated further by its implementers [1] . This seems to be a serious shortfall, because especially in the privacy field an open specification which protects user rights could do a lot to let users feel more comfortable.
In a survey on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research different DRM systems were examined concerning their privacy protection and user friendliness [6] among them were iTunes, Musicload with Microsoft Windows Media Rights Manager, Sony DRM and Adobe Digital Media Store.
The survey revealed that nearly none of the systems offered an anonymous rights acquisition, that most of the time customers had to reveal personal information which was not necessary for the transaction, and that the systems stealthy gathered additional information without notifying the user. In purchased iTunes-files there were even unencrypted personal details of the customer; the other systems encrypted additional data in the files, so it could not be analysed further if they compromise user privacy. The conclusion of the survey is that the examined DRM systems are unhandy, intransparent, even threateningly and isolate users because they are not interoperable.
In [7] it is exclusively stated that transparency for personal data is recommended for a better practice and thus for a greater user acceptance.
For other work in this field see Michiels et al [8] for a view into the design of DRM architectures, Arnab and Hutchison [9] which examine how to improve the fairness to the end user of DRM systems, Cohen [5] which examines aspects concerning the law and user privacy in DRM systems or [10] for a position paper of the W3C on privacy and DRM.
Requirements for a Privacy-Protected DRM System
From the preceding considerations the following requirements can be deduced for a privacy protected DRM environment:
o The user should only enter as little information as is absolutely necessary to conduct the requested services. o Information shall only be given to parties which can be trusted by the user. Ideally user information should only be kept at one central place entrusted in the care of a respectable institution. o It should be well-known to the user which data is send over the network. o The decision if the vendors can survey purchase statistics per user should be in the control of the user. o Data should always be send encrypted in a way so that only the designated recipient can decrypt it. o The system should be designed and implemented in an open manner, so that its privacy protection can be proven and trusted.
Architectural Draft
To secure user privacy we have to introduce a third trusted party in the content and rights acquisition scheme of the DRM scenario. This party is some sort of financial institution which offers services for the user and the DRM provider and is trusted by both of them.
The new architecture can be seen in Figure 2 and is described in detail below.
Communication between Customer and License-issuer
The first message which is sent in the whole scenario is issued by the Customer and directed at the License-Issuer to get the possibly different licenses related to a specified content object (as seen in Figure 3 ). The content acquisition itself is not part of the process because it can be done in arbitrary ways like direct download from the Content-Provider or super-distribution through a peer-to-peer network, which is possible because the content objects are encrypted. The ContentID and the URL of the License-Issuer which is needed to address this message correctly can be read out from the content object. The ContentID in this message specifies a content object in a unique way for which the License-Issuer offers corresponding licenses. As a response to this request, the License-Issuer sends its certificate to authenticate itself and an asymmetrically encrypted list of the available licenses seen in Figure 4 . The contained descriptions should be human readable. The concrete implementation of this message exchange can be chosen conforming with given requirements. Preferably it shall be implemented with Web Services, because of their standardized security extensions and because their design fits very well into this kind of service oriented architecture, but it could also be implemented using standard HTTP(S)-technology to ease operating system integration.
Communication between Customer and Bank
To ensure the anonymity of the customer to other persons who might intercept the communication there is a need to encrypt the data which is sent. Furthermore the customer has to authenticate herself to the bank and the other way round. This is essential because the bank must determine the identity of the customer for choosing the right account which should be charged. Moreover the customer wants to know if she really communicates to the real bank-server. If she was not doing so she could expose private data. A widely accepted solution for such needs is a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). For more information on PKIs see [11] .
The bank has to administrate its own Certification Authority and give out a certificate for each of its online users. The certificate could be used both for authentication and for encryption. The key-pair for a customer should be generated on the customers computer and her private key must not be known by the bank. Otherwise the user would not be secured against being spoofed by the bank.
However, even if every part of the certificate would be generated from the bank this would still not be worse than the current situation where customers are trusting their financial institutions. But it would not make use of the full potential of the described architecture.
Customer and Bank have to exchange two messages. The first one, the LicenseRequest Initiation message (seen in Figure 5 ) is sent from the customer to the bank as an order to start a license acquisition process. The message contains an encrypted session key, which is encrypted with the public key of the License-Issuer so that it can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key by the Issuer. With this session key the Issuer afterwards encrypts the license object which is returned, so that only the customer is able to decrypt it. Additionally the License-Request Initiation message contains one license option from an afore acquired list, which the customer wants to buy. To this license option a current time stamp is attached and then signed by the customer. This signed license option can be regarded as a contract between the DRM vendor and the customer, it contains the validity of the product, its price and description, the time of the customer request and is signed by both the customer and the DRM vendor, so none of them could reject it.
The last information in this message is the Issuer's URL or other identification, so the bank knows how to communicate with the Issuer.
After receiving and processing this message the bank contacts the License-Issuer and tries to acquire the specified license for the customer which is shown in section 4.3 which describes the bank to License-Issuer communication. The second message then is the response from the bank to the customer seen in Figure 6 . If the status contains "success" the request has been successful and a license has been provided which is then forwarded to the customer. Otherwise the status contains a failure description. 
Communication between Bank and License-issuer
This communication has to be secured, too, but in this case in two ways. In this case it is impossible to use a specific Certification Authority on either the bank's or the Issuer's side (e.g. the bank could not be demanded to manage certificates for all possible Issuers). Both bank and Issuer have to acquire a certificate from one of the public certification authorities. Even though this is coupled with spending money the effort is negligible in comparison to the possible benefits. They will most probably already have such certificates nowadays. The certificates could then be used as in the previous scenario to authenticate and encrypt data.
The first message in this context is sent by the bank after it has received a LicenseRequest Initiation from the customer (see Figure 7) . This message contains the license selection, which the bank received from the customer and the certificate of the bank. Before forwarding the license selection the bank removes the signature of the customer to preserve the customer's privacy. The bank then signs the license request to ensure its authenticity. As a reply to the license-acquisition message the Issuer sends the message shown in Figure 8 to the bank. The account data is needed for the bank to transfer money for the license. By sending this message the contract is closed and after forwarding the license to the customer (as described in section 4.2) the bank should carry out the cash remittance to the License-Issuer. At this point it can also be seen clearly, that the concrete implementation of this protocol has to ensure that no message could become lost. In a Web Service scenario this can be accomplished by the use of WS-Reliable Messaging [12] . 
Conclusion
To further investigate our drafted architecture and to proof our concepts we implemented a prototypical scenario with the described components and the proposed protocol. Technically our implementation uses Web Services for the communication and the security related requirements are solved by the use of Web Service Security functionality like encryption, signing and certificates.
Summing up we found the following benefits of the drafted architecture:
+ Privacy-protection of the customer. Only the Trusted Bank needs to know the customers data (and the banks already have the necessary data of their customers). Vendors do not need and have no chance to know who is buying their goods. Just if the customer chooses to use the same session key for one or more vendors repeatedly, it would be possible for the vendors to collect anonymous purchase-statistics. Additionally there is just one point where customer data is stored, so it is easier to protect user privacy at this point through an independent party and by sophisticated technical and organisational means. + Digitally signed contracts. They provide an evidence for both customer and seller and thus ensure the non-repudiation of the transaction. + Trust in being paid. License-Issuers can be sure they are actually paid, because they only have to trust a few banks, in contrast to thousands different users and the bank is able to check the accounts of its users before the acquisition. + Unique way for money transfers. The billing for all transactions is handled in the same way. The customer and the vendors are not burdened anymore to handle different money transfer schemes. The Issuers do not have to build their own accounting interface as today. + Bank advantage. As central service provider in online trade with digital goods. + Usability. Better usability for the customer, because it is not necessary anymore to create different accounts (for each vendor) or give away personal information more than one time.
One can see that there are certain benefits not only for the customer, but also for banks and Content-Owners/License-Issuers. On the other hand this solution would impose the following burdens, which however should be far more than compensated by the afore mentioned points:
-Additional infrastructure. The banks have to set up a highly accessible service interface, but they already have similar services e.g. for online-banking. -Single point of failure. The trusted-bank is the bottleneck of the architecture. Even if data-throughput should be low because of the simple protocol and the small messages which are exchanged, the servers have to be secured against denial of service, but the same issues are already addressed in recent classical online banking systems. -Effort to establish PKIs. Additional effort has to be considered to establish the Public-Key-Infrastructure for the trust relationships.
